Methodology

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) plays a leading role in advancing global authoritarianism, including through efforts to shape and manipulate news and information. Beijing’s Global Media Influence (BGMI) is Freedom House’s first global assessment of CCP media influence and democratic resilience to that influence. Our research has identified the key methods by which the CCP and its proxies work to influence news coverage abroad. Scores determined according to a comprehensive methodology and qualitative country narratives assess these methods, their impact, and a country’s preparedness to safeguard against or respond to manipulation efforts.

What We Study

Beijing’s methods for shaping information environments around the globe are complex and often opaque. The BGMI project aims to reveal the many forms media influence from Beijing can take— ranging from acceptable forms of public diplomacy to covert, coercive, or corrupting tactics that risk undermining democratic freedoms.

In conducting the research for this report, Freedom House identified five key strategies for CCP-linked foreign media influence efforts:

• Propaganda and promotion of preferred narratives, including overt and covert, and direct and indirect avenues for transmitting Chinese state­–produced or influenced content to local audiences.
• Disinformation campaigns, defined for the purposes of this report as the purposeful dissemination of false or misleading content, especially through inauthentic activity—via fake accounts, for example—on global social media platforms.
• Censorship and intimidation, including restrictions placed on journalists in China that affect global news coverage, and coercive actions taken by Chinese state-linked actors to suppress or penalize critical reporting and commentary abroad.
• Control over content-distribution infrastructure, primarily by China-based companies with state ownership or other close CCP ties, and a record of complicity in politicized censorship or surveillance within China or abroad.
• Dissemination of CCP norms and governance model, such as training for foreign journalists and officials on CCP “news management” practices, or export of website-filtering equipment.

The project also examines direct responses to CCP media influence in each country under review, and its underlying resilience or vulnerability to problematic influence or manipulation efforts emanating from Beijing. Relevant factors considered include laws and practices that protect press freedom, the extent of critical and diverse news coverage related to China and Chinese investment in the local economy, and both generic and China-specific initiatives by governments and civil society to counter disinformation, screen investments in media and digital industries, enhance transparency, and protect press freedom and freedom of expression.

The BGMI methodology was created by Freedom House in consultation with international experts on media freedom and regulation, CCP foreign influence, disinformation, the Chinese diaspora, and the regions of the world under study. The resulting framework captures a vast array of issues related to understanding Beijing’s media influence and potential country responses through the lens of upholding freedom of expression and human rights.

Country Selection

The 30 countries included in this study were selected based on several criteria. First, as a study not only of Beijing’s influence efforts but also of the response and impact in democratic settings, the sample for this project was limited to countries that are rated Free or Partly Free by Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index. Second, to achieve a robust global analysis we sought a diverse sample in terms of geography (six regions covered), language (over 25 local languages), and nature of bilateral relations with China (friendly versus adversarial; Belt and Road Initiative member or not; China as a major or minor trading partner or source of investment). Third, we looked for countries where there was clear evidence of media influence from China, and examples of resilience to CCP media or political influence. Fourth, we considered a country’s strategic importance and population size, with a preference for countries with relatively large populations or strategic relevance.

Research Process

Freedom House staff invited at least one local researcher to serve as the primary analyst for each country, training them to assess Beijing’s media influence efforts and local resilience according to the project’s comprehensive research and scoring rubric (see below). Local researchers conducted desk research and interviews with members of the media, government, and civil society, then submitted responses to a questionnaire (see below), with responses determining proposed scores. Local researchers then attended a review meeting focused on their region to discuss key findings, regional trends, best practices, and recommendations. Freedom House staff fact-checked research, supplementing it as needed via Chinese-language or other research, and authored country reports. The local analyst, a regional adviser, and other relevant experts then reviewed the scores and country narratives. After completing regional and country consultations, Freedom House staff performed a final review of all narratives and scores to ensure their comparative consistency and integrity.

Country narratives (6,000-8,000 words) provide depth and nuance to the analysis, including details supporting scores and broader dynamics related to both influence efforts and domestic resilience and responses. Translations of all country reports into the dominant local language will be published to ensure accessibility of the research to policymakers, civil society, and media professionals in each country of study.

Drawing on the resulting data set and robust cross-country qualitative analysis, Freedom House staff determined the global report’s key findings. The resulting study is the first application of this methodology to a set of countries. Future editions, pending funding, may refine and update the methodology, including to incorporate emerging influence tactics or response initiatives. The end product represents the consensus of the analysts, advisers, and Freedom House staff, who are responsible for any final decisions.

Scoring Process

The BGMI methodology’s questionnaire includes 150 questions, divided into two main categories of equal value (see full “Checklist of Questions” below):

• Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts: Eighty-five questions, each worth a single point, detail overt and covert forms of Chinese state media content dissemination, disinformation, censorship and intimidation, control over content infrastructure, and dissemination of CCP norms and practices. The total score is the sum of the number of avenues of influence that were found to be present in that country. Based on the score, Freedom House assigned the following status ratings reflecting the extent of Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts in a particular country:
  • Low: 0-29
  • Notable: 30-35
  • High: 36-45
  • Very High: 46 or above


• Resilience and Response: 65 questions analyze various sources of resilience or responses to specific actions taken by the CCP and its proxies across four sectors: media, legal, political, and civil society. The final section of this category includes questions that account for problematic forms of pushback, which may have the effect of limiting CCP influence but which also infringe on freedom of information rights or well-being of members of the local Chinese diaspora.

Most questions are worth 1 point, assessing the presence or absence of a particular type of law, policy response, media action, or civil society initiative. Select questions are worth more than one point to give sufficient weight to underlying democratic rights, press freedom protections, existing expertise on China, and public skepticism towards Chinese state-produced content.  The “problematic pushback” section includes five questions each worth 1 negative point that is subtracted from the overall Resilience and Response score. The final score for the Resilience and Response is a sum of all points accrued, adjusted to an 85-point scale to match the range reflecting Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts. [Formula used to adjust the Resilience and Response score = (RR positive score - PP score) * (1.18)]

Based on the resilience and response score, Freedom House also assigned the following status ratings reflecting the extent of Response and Resilience in a particular country. (While the score is intended to reflect degree of resilience, countries may receive low scores due to a low rate of influence efforts to respond to.)

• Low: 0-30
• Notable: 31-40
• High: 41-50
• Very High: 51 and above

Vulnerable or Resilient: The Beijing’s Media Influence Efforts score is subtracted from the Resilience and Response score to product the Resilience or Vulnerability rating. This rating reflects how well equipped a country is to respond to influence efforts it is facing. Freedom House assigned the status rating as follows:

• Resilient: Difference of 6 points and above
• Vulnerable: Difference of 5 points or fewer.

Scores strictly cover the period of January 2019 to December 2021, while analysis in narratives may extend beyond this timeframe as needed for context or updates.

Replication

Freedom House is providing a blank template of the methodology questions and relevant formulas for arriving at a score and status for any researchers, journalists, or civic groups in a country not covered in the initial sample who would wish to apply the analytical framework to their own country. Please provide credit to Freedom House for the methodology.

The full dataset for the 30 countries included in this study is available here .

Methodology Questions

Note: All questions are worth 1 point unless otherwise indicated.

Beijing’s media influence efforts (85 questions)

Propaganda and promotion of favored narratives (38 questions)

• Were Chinese state media channels (like China Global Television Network) available on local television (free-to-air, digital, cable)?

• Were Chinese state media print publications distributed in the country (such as China Daily or magazines)?
• Did Chinese state media programming air on local radio stations?
• Were Chinese state media available in at least one of the dominant local language(s)?
• Did the local Chinese ambassador and/or Chinese diplomatic outpost (embassy or consulate) have a Twitter or other social media account?
• Did a local Chinese state media or diplomatic social media account have 10,000 or more followers?
• Did a local Chinese state media or diplomatic social media account have 100,000 or more followers?
• Did Chinese official accounts appear to receive substantial engagement from authentic local users?
• Did any news outlet in the country publish an insert from a Chinese state-run news outlet or other Chinese official entity?
• Did a major news outlet in the country publish an insert from a Chinese state-run news outlet or other Chinese official entity?
• Did Chinese state media content appear in politically or geographically diverse local news outlets?
• Did a Chinese official or diplomat publish at least one op-ed in a local outlet during the coverage period?
• Did a Chinese official or diplomat publish ten or more op-eds in local outlets?
• Was a Chinese official or diplomat featured in an interview with a major news outlet during the coverage period?
• Were there any examples of Chinese officials, companies, or an agent acting on their behalf paying local media to publish or write articles?
• Did a major private news outlet have a content-sharing agreement in effect with a Chinese state-owned outlet, such as Xinhua, China News Service, or China Central Television?
• Did a publicly funded news outlet have a content-sharing agreement in effect with a Chinese state-owned outlet, such as Xinhua, China News Service, or China Central Television?
• Did a news syndication service or news wire in the country have a content-sharing agreement in effect with a Chinese state-owned news outlet such as Xinhua, China News Service, or China Central Television?
• Has a news outlet that signed a content-sharing agreement with a Chinese state-owned outlet such as Xinhua, China News Service, or China Central Television published its content during the coverage period?
• Were there examples of content from Chinese officials or state media appearing in local outlets without their origin being labeled?
• Have any local news outlets participated in a joint news network with Chinese state media, such as Asia News Network or Belt and Road News Network?
• Did a Chinese state media–produced documentary or one-time news program air on local television?
• Was there a regularly scheduled timeslot on local television reserved for Chinese state media produced programming?
• Did a video or radio co-production between a local media outlet and Chinese state media on news or current affairs air on broadcast media or their online presence?
• Was a Chinese state-media local representative or correspondent active on social media with a large local following (20,000 followers or more)?
• Were there examples of social media influencers with financial or other ties to the Chinese government that published pro-Beijing content who garnered a large local following (20,000 followers or more)?
• Did any local journalists, editors, media executives, or media owners travel to China on a trip subsidized by the Chinese government or related company or participated elsewhere in a Chinese government or CCP-led media summit between 2019 and 2021?
• Were any local journalists, editors, media executives, or media owners who had traveled to China on a trip subsidized by the Chinese government or related company prior to 2019 working in the industry during the coverage period?
• Did a journalist or media executive returning from a subsidized press trip to China publish an article or public comments repeating preferred CCP talking points?
• Has a local journalist union signed a memorandum of understanding or otherwise partnered with the All China Journalists Association, a Chinese state media outlet, or the local Chinese embassy?
• Did a Chinese company or individual with close Chinese government or CCP ties own a meaningful stake in a local news outlet or media company?
• Were there examples of media outlets with friendly ties to the Chinese government (including investment from a Chinese company) whose editorial line strongly promoted Beijing’s preferred narratives?
• Did a top local political leader—a president, prime minister, foreign minister, member of Parliament, etc.—make comments to the media echoing CCP propaganda narratives or talking points?
• Did local opinion leaders (scholars, think tank researchers, experts, columnists) whose views align closely with the Chinese government have a significant influence over political commentary related to China and bilateral relations?
• Has a business entity (PRC-based or local) with interests in China or in enhancing Chinese investment in the country under study tried to exert influence over news coverage in a manner favorable to Beijing and its interests?
• Was there any evidence that politicians, opinion leaders, or scholars received money from a PRC-linked entity in exchange for making comments or publishing articles in line with Beijing’s preferred narratives?
• Did Chinese-language news outlets that are either Chinese state-owned or are pro-Beijing play a dominant role in shaping the news content accessible to Chinese speakers?
• Did any local Chinese-language journalists, editors, or media executives attend a Chinese government– or CCP-sponsored media gathering during the coverage period?

Disinformation campaigns (9 questions)

• Did Chinese state-affiliated actors openly promote falsehoods (including manipulated imagery) or misleading content to news consumers in the country through online or offline channels (e.g. diplomatic or embassy social media accounts or websites)?
• Has evidence emerged of inauthentic behavior and fake accounts being used to amplify social media posts by Chinese diplomats or state media active in the country under study?
• Has documentation emerged of a disinformation campaign linked to China that targeted news consumers in the country of study and deployed inauthentic behavior (tactics like bots, fake accounts, and content farms)?
• Has documentation emerged in the country of multiple disinformation campaigns linked to China that targeted news consumers in the country of study and deployed inauthentic behavior?
• Has documentation emerged in the country of ten or more disinformation campaigns linked to China that targeted news consumers in the country of study and deployed inauthentic behavior?
• Have there been documented disinformation campaigns linked to China that sought to amplify domestic divisions within the country of study (including regarding racial/ethnic or partisan political tensions) or the country’s international alliances?
• Have there been documented disinformation campaigns linked to China that sought to clearly support, oppose, or slander a political party or electoral candidate in the country under study?
• Have mainstream news outlets, social media influencers, or local political leaders knowingly or unknowingly shared messages spread through local or global documented disinformation campaigns?
• Was there evidence of messages from a documented disinformation campaign that reached news consumers in the country having an observable impact on public debate or perceptions in the direction favored by Beijing?

Censorship and intimidation (21 questions)

• Was a local news outlet’s website blocked in China?
• Was a foreign correspondent based in China from a local news outlet expelled from or denied entry to China due to their reporting, or worsening bilateral relations with their home country?
• Was a foreign correspondent physically blocked by security forces or officials in China from reporting a story to readers or viewers in their home country?
• Have the China-based relatives of journalists living in the country of study—including from the Chinese diaspora or exile communities—faced harassment, intimidation, or detention by Chinese authorities in an apparent effort to discourage the journalist from reporting critically about the Chinese government?
• Have Chinese government representatives (including diplomats) made public comments or sent private messages that intimidate, threaten, or insult local journalists or commentators in apparent retaliation for their reporting about China or the Chinese government?
• Has the local government (including via its own ownership, editorial control, or other leverage over local media) taken actions to suppress critical coverage of China, the Chinese government, or China-linked activities in the country?
• Has the local government taken any legal action (including detention or regulatory action) against local media or journalists critical of the Chinese government?
• Did media outlets with friendly ties to the Chinese government (including both private media and media companies linked to the local government) suppress or avoid news and commentary critical of human rights abuses or other political developments in China (including in Hong Kong)?
• Did media outlets with friendly ties to the Chinese government (including both private media and media companies linked to the local government) suppress or avoid stories critical of Chinese investment or related activities in the country under study?
• Did media outlets with friendly ties to the Chinese government (including both private media and media companies linked to the local government) dismiss, punish, or demote journalists or columnists critical of the Chinese government or Chinese activities in the country under study, without their being reinstated?
• Were there incidents of advertisers avoiding or revoking ads from media critical of China—either of their own accord or because of Chinese government or diplomatic pressure?
• Were restrictions placed on the distribution channels (such as cable television access or newspaper distribution sites) of media outlets critical of China due to direct or indirect Chinese government influence, with those restrictions still in place during the coverage period?
• Did any pro-Beijing entrepreneurs or other powerful individuals file or threaten to file defamation suits against local media or journalists over reporting critical of China, the CCP, or CCP influence in the country of study?
• Were apps of news outlets based in the country of study inaccessible from app stores in China, having been removed by technology firms hosting the stores?
• Have any cyberattacks (including hacking attempts) occurred against journalists in the country of study that are critical of China occurred that could be reasonably linked to China-based actors or attributed to them based on available evidence?
• Have any cyberattacks occurred against media outlets in the country of study that are critical of China occurred that could be reasonably linked to China-based actors or attributed to them based on available evidence?
• Were there social media posts or inauthentic campaigns linked to China or Chinese state media reports that sought to slander a Chinese dissident in the country under study?
• Were there any physical attacks against media workers in the country who are critical of China, or against their offices or other property, that could be reasonably attributed to Beijing-linked actors or for which evidence exists linking them to Chinese government actors or proxies?
• Have local journalists or commentators critical of the Chinese government reported being intimidated or verbally abused online by CCP-aligned trolls?
• Were there topics sensitive to the Chinese government that one would expect to be of interest to local audiences, but which are largely absent from mainstream news coverage and commentary—such as problematic dimensions of Chinese investment in the local economy, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Falun Gong, Tibet, Taiwan, top CCP leader corruption, or COVID-19 origins?
• Did local journalists or commentators report self-censoring or appear to avoid reporting in ways that the Chinese government might object to?

Control over content distribution infrastructure (10 questions)

• Did companies headquartered in China or with financial ties to the Chinese government operate a portion of the digital television or cable television infrastructure in the country under study?
• Have companies headquartered in China or with financial ties to the Chinese government used control over television distribution infrastructure to favor Chinese-state media content over independent or critical sources of information?
• Was a social media application owned by a China-based company among the top 10 most downloaded or used apps in the country in either of the last three years (2019, 2020, 2021)?
• Was an aggregator application owned by a China-based company among the top 10 most downloaded or used apps in the country in either of the last three years (2019, 2020,2021)?
• Have there been reports of local users of apps owned by China-based companies encountering censorship of political or religious commentary related to China, or of other moderation policies that reflect the CCP’s party line?
• Did local political leaders or government agencies have accounts on apps owned by China-based companies that they use to communicate with constituents?
• Did local media outlets or journalists have accounts on apps owned by China-based companies that they use to communicate with local news consumers?
• Did local news outlets or journalists report encountering politicized censorship or self-censoring to avoid reprisals when posting news stories and commentary for local audiences to accounts on apps owned by China-based companies?
• Did Chinese state-owned companies (like China Mobile or China Unicom), or private companies with a record of censorship or surveillance in China (like Huawei) own or manage all or part of the mobile phone infrastructure in the country?
• Did Chinese state-owned (like China Mobile or China Unicom), or private companies with a record of censorship or surveillance in China (like Huawei or Xiaomi) have a meaningful market share among local mobile devices (over 10 percent)?

Dissemination of CCP media norms, tactics, or governance models (7 questions)

• Did local journalists attend trainings in China or hosted by Chinese officials but held elsewhere that emphasized journalistic norms favoring positive coverage or promotion of government views, rather than editorial independence and a watchdog approach to journalism?
• Were there examples of journalists relaying that they have applied lessons learned from such trainings to their own reporting practices?
• Did local officials attend trainings in China or hosted by Chinese officials on “news management” or “public opinion guidance” or other forms of information influence?
• Was there any evidence of local officials applying lessons learned from such trainings to influence public opinion in the country or suppress critical voices?
• Did Chinese state actors provide technical or financial support (such as upgrades to broadcasting equipment) to local media outlets in the country?
• Did Chinese state actors provide technical or financial support (such as upgrades to broadcasting equipment) to local media outlets that create imbalances in the media market by favoring certain outlets over others?
• Did Chinese officials or China-based companies provide technical support facilitating internet censorship (such as website blocking) or social media manipulation to local politicians, enabling them to take action vis-à-vis their own political opponents?

Resilience and response (65 questions)

Media (22 questions)

• What was the overall level of media freedom in the country? (Per the D1 question from the latest edition of Freedom in the World) (0-4 points)
• Were the standards of media professionalism and journalistic ethics in the country generally considered high, moderate, or low? (0-2 points)
• Did influential news outlets in the country under study have the resources, skills, and personnel to conduct investigative reporting generally, on topics unrelated to China?
• Did influential local news outlets in the country have reporters or commentators dedicated to the coverage of China, who have garnered independent expertise on the topic?
• Was at least one foreign correspondent from the country who is stationed in mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan and produces independent reporting?
• Did major media in the country report or feature stories critical of Beijing regarding events in China (such as the persecution of Muslims in Xinjiang), including from international news wire services?
• Were independent international sources (such as news wires, foreign NGOs, or international think tanks) used for coverage of China, including for stories critical of Beijing?
• Did news outlets with content-sharing or other agreements with Chinese state media also publish stories critical of the Chinese government or CCP policies either in China or abroad?
• Did major media in the country report stories critical of the Chinese governments’ activities or behavior within the country under study (such as regarding investments, corruption, labor rights, territorial disputes, etc.)?
• Did major media report about CCP foreign influence, including in the political, media or information space, in the country or globally?
• Did reporting critical of the Chinese government and CCP appear in politically or geographically diverse local news outlets?
• Did individual journalists publicly report on efforts by the Chinese government or CCP-linked actors to influence their reporting?
• Did any news outlets reject or discontinue paid advertorials or other content placements from Chinese state media outlets?
• Did journalist educational programs (including continuing education and civil society organized trainings) include sessions or units about Chinese government tactics for influencing foreign media, and appropriate ethical responses from reporters?
• Did the country have an independent press council serving as a forum for print and other media to self-regulate?
• Did a press council issue any guidance on ethical standards and best practices that is relevant to media influence from China?
• Were there any local Chinese-language media pursuing reporting and analysis independent of the Chinese party-state?
• Were there examples of business models or funding sources for independent media that have helped increase resilience to CCP pressure and economic coercion tactics?
• Did local media and journalists demonstrate solidarity when responding to attacks on or censorship of individual reporters by powerful local actors?
• Did local media and journalists demonstrate solidarity when responding to attacks on or censorship of individual reporters or outlets by Chinese party-state actors or their proxies?
• Did international social media platforms remove disinformation networks linked to China relevant to the country under study?
• Did international social media platforms label most Chinese government affiliated accounts and news sources as tied to the Chinese state on the dominant social media platform(s) in the country?

Legal (22 questions)

• Did the constitution or other laws protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by an independent judiciary? (Per the C1 question from the  latest edition of Freedom on the Net) (0-6 points)
• Was there an independent media regulatory body?
• Were there laws or regulations in place that enhanced transparency related to media ownership, including by foreign entities?
• Was there a high degree of transparency surrounding media ownership?
• Were foreign influence or media ownership transparency laws enforced with regard to China’s activities, including the labeling and/or registration of Chinese state-run media outlets?
• Did the country have broadcasting or media regulations in place that govern cross-ownership in order to prevent artificial suppression of competitors?
• Were rules that governed cross-ownership enforced in a fair, rigorous, and consistent manner with regard to China-linked companies or individuals?
• Did the country have anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) laws or legal precedents in place that can limit lawsuits against reporting related to China or other topics that are in the public interest?
• Were anti-SLAPP laws or decisions applied in relevant China-related cases?
• Did the country have laws that place limitations on the proportion of foreign ownership in media, particularly broadcast media?
• Were rules limiting foreign ownership stakes applied in cases involving China-based or CCP-linked individuals or companies?
• Were there laws that place limitations on political party or other partisan ownership in media, particularly broadcast media?
• Were rules limiting political party or other partisan ownership in media applied in cases involving Chinese party-state owned media outlets?
• Was there public consultations and/or a competitive bidding process for projects involving potential China-based or CCP-linked company investment in media or digital infrastructure?
• Was there an investment screening and review mechanism regarding foreign ownership or investment in the media, including as a result of the media being designated a strategic industry?
• Was a screening mechanism applied to Chinese government or CCP-linked efforts to purchase stakes in the local media?
• Did the country have an investment screening and review mechanism regarding foreign ownership or investment in digital information infrastructure?
• Was a screening mechanism applied to Chinese government or CCP-linked investment in digital infrastructure, including social media applications?
• Was there a mechanism, such as a human rights commission or labor relations board, through which victims of censorship or dismissals due to Chinese-government influence can seek legal redress?
• Did any victim of censorship or dismissal allegedly tied to Chinese-government influence file a lawsuit or otherwise seek legal redress?
• Were the perpetrators of physical attacks or harassment of journalists critical of the Chinese government or CCP prosecuted?
• Did court decisions in cases related to Chinese media influence (defamation, dismissals, arbitrary detention) display independence and due process?

Political (7 questions)

• Did political leaders or elected representatives (in the ruling party or opposition) publicly express concern over covert, corrupting, or coercive incidents of CCP foreign influence, including in the political, media, and information space?
• When commenting on Chinese government influence, including in the media and information space, did political leaders make a conscious effort to differentiate between the CCP and the people of China or members of the local Chinese diaspora?
• Were parliamentary hearings or inquiries held on the topic of covert, corrupting, or coercive CCP foreign influence, including in the political, media, and information space?
• Were local Chinese diplomats rebuked or otherwise punished after intimidating or threatening journalists, commentators, news outlets, or advertisers?
• Were there governmental initiatives to track foreign disinformation and media influence, including from China?
• Did interagency bureaucratic structures and regulations exist to guide government officials on how to respond to foreign disinformation and media influence, including from China?
• Did political leaders or government agencies work with technology firms and civil society to engage in multistakeholder initiatives to limit covert, corrupting, or coercive dimensions of Chinese government media influence?

Civil society (9 questions)

• What was the extent of independent in-country expertise regarding Chinese domestic politics, bilateral relations, and CCP foreign influence operations? (Very low, low, moderate, high) (0-3 points)
• Were independent experts (in-country or foreign) on China or the CCP regularly consulted by government officials or cited in news reports on relevant topics?
• Were there independent civil society groups that monitor and advocate for press and internet freedom in the country generally?
• Were there nongovernmental initiatives to track, expose, and counter mis- and disinformation?
• Were there nongovernmental (NGO, scholarly, or think tank) initiatives to monitor China’s media, social media presence in the country and its impact, including with regards to disinformation?
• Were there civil society advocacy initiatives regarding policies that would reduce the covert, corrupting, or coercive dimensions of CCP influence on the media and information space in the country?
• Were there examples of media literacy programs for the general public?
• Were there incidents of members of the public pushing back against instances of Chinese government-linked media influence, such as criticizing mislabeled advertorials?
• To what extent did news consumers appear to be skeptical of content produced by Chinese state media or affiliated actors? (Not at all, somewhat, very much so] (0-2 points)

Problematic pushback (5 questions, each worth -1 point)

• Did the government or regulators block or ban any China-based apps on national security or other grounds without a transparent process, clear legal basis, or opportunity for appeal?
• Did the government or regulators place any arbitrary restrictions on the activities of Chinese state media or journalists in the country under study (such as expelling journalists or blocking content distribution)?
• Were there examples of local political leaders making public comments that exaggerate or take advantage of legitimate concerns over CCP influence to advance their own political power or suppress opposition?
• Were there examples of local political leaders, media outlets, or commentators appearing to exaggerate or take advantage of legitimate concerns over CCP influence in a manner that has fueled anti-Chinese and xenophobic sentiment?
• Did a political atmosphere of suspicion surrounding CCP influence appear to contribute to physical attacks, hate crimes, unsubstantiated accusations of spying, or other repercussions for local members of the Chinese diaspora?